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Abstract This article aims to develop a Lacanian approach
to bioethics. Point of departure is the fact that both psy-
choanalysis and bioethics are practices of language,
combining diagnostics with therapy. Subsequently, I will
point out how Lacanian linguistics may help us to elucidate
the dynamics of both psychoanalytical and bioethical dis-
course, using the movie One flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest
and Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone as key examples. Next, I
will explain the ‘topology’ of the bioethical landscape with
the help of Lacan’s three dimensions: the imaginary, the
symbolical and the real. This will culminate in an assess-
ment of the dynamics of bioethical discourse with the help
of Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses. Bioethics, I will
argue, is not a homogeneous discourse. Rather, four
modalities of bioethical discourse can be distinguished, all
of them displaying specific weaknesses and strengths,
opportunities and threats. This will be elucidated with the
help of two case studies, namely the debates on human
reproductive technologies and on the use of animals as
biomedical research models.
Keywords Bioethics · Lacanian psychoanalysis ·
Psychoanalysis and bioethics · Linguistics and bioethics ·
Ethics of animal research · Discourse analysis · Ethical
expertise · Reproductive technologies · Forensic psychiatry
Introduction
In the opening lines of Bioethics on the Couch, the Nor-
wegian bioethicist Jan Helge Solbakk explains how the
idea for writing his paper came to him during a visit to the
Freud Museum in Vienna (Berggasse 19). While relaxing
on a replica of the famous couch, he sent “a message to my
companion telling her where, in that particular moment, I
was horizontally situated” (Solbakk 2013, p. 319). He
immediately received a response, an injunction in fact,
coming from the ‘Other’, as Lacan would phrase it, urging
him to write a paper on bioethics and psychoanalysis; a
summons with which he eventually complied (after the
idea had been floating in his mind for some time),
explaining how both practices have some very important
features in common;—both tend to combine ‘analysis’ with
‘therapy’, for instance. But he also explained how, after
modern medicine had ‘fathered’ bioethics, as he phrased it,
the latter subsequently failed to reach the stage of auton-
omy, in Solbakk’s opinion at least, remaining too
dependent on its parent, as “an integral part of the medico-
scientific establishment”, a “handmaiden within the med-
ico-industrial complex”, functioning as a “governance
tool”, rather than as a truly critical voice (p. 320). In other
words, bioethics could do with some self-analysis.
In this paper, I attempt something similar, adhering to a
similar injunction, albeit more systematically than in Sol-
bakk’s brief essay. My objective is to flesh out how (in my
case: Lacanian) psychoanalysis may help us to unravel the
intriguing dynamics and paradoxes of bioethical discourse,
but also the uneasiness (or even discontent) which this
discourse continues to invoke, among critics, but also
among those who practice it, such as Solbakk. For indeed,
experiences of ambivalence have accompanied bioethics
from the very beginning, both internally and externally, so
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that the signifier ‘bioethicist’ refers to an exciting, but also
controversial, perhaps even “impossible” profession, to use a
phrase coined by Freud (1925/1948, p. 565, 1937/1950,
p. 94). In other words, I intend to show how Lacanian psy-
choanalysis allows us to reflect on bioethics, not only as a
success story, but also as a target of criticism and concern,
even among authors who identify themselves academically
with it. Its controversial status and reputation stems from the
fact that bioethics is not a homogeneous discourse. Rather,
four different modalities of bioethical discourse can be dis-
tinguished, all of them displaying specific weaknesses and
strengths, opportunities and threats.
The idea for writing this paper has been fermenting for
quite some time, ever since I became involved in bioethics
(more than 25 years ago), as a continental philosopher for
whom Lacanian psychoanalysis remained a source of
inspiration. In other words, my endeavour amounts to self-
analysis, an assessment ‘from within’, based on my expe-
rience as a practicing bioethicist: a participant in the
discourse, using Lacan’s oeuvre as my frame of reference.
The design of my paper is as follows. After outlining
what can be expected and gained from such an exercise, I
will point out that both psychoanalysis and bioethics are
practices of language in the radical sense. Both stress the
primacy of discourse and the responsivity of moral subjects
to the claims and imperatives of the Other. Therefore, the
royal road towards bridging the gap or enacting a dialogue
between psychoanalysis and bioethics runs via language,
more specifically: via linguistics. Subsequently, I will
explain the ‘topology’ of the bioethical landscape with the
help of Lacan’s three dimensions: the imaginary, the
symbolical and the real. Finally, the analysis will culminate
in an assessment of the dynamics of bioethical discourse
with the help of Lacan’s theorem of the four discourses,
which will be elucidated by two exemplifications, namely
the debates on human reproduction and on animal models
in biomedical research.
Preliminary exploration: psychoanalysis
and bioethics
The objective of my paper may come as a surprise, as in
mainstream bioethics Jacques Lacan is hardly ever men-
tioned. Even if we take into account that continental
philosophy as such seems somewhat underrepresented
(compared to analytic philosophy), prominent contempo-
raries such as Heidegger, Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty,
Foucault, Bataille or even Deleuze have more presence in
bioethics than Lacan. Moreover, bioethics does not fig-
ure prominently in Lacan’s oeuvre either, although, on
closer inspection, highly interesting sections can be found
on issues such as organ transplantation, genetics, molecular
biology, embodiment and the cyborg-debate. But the point
of my article is not to present a Lacanian view on specific
issues (as I have done elsewhere), but rather to analyse the
structure and dynamics of bioethical discourse as such.
Although the interaction between bioethics and Laca-
nianism so far has remained an idiosyncratic fold in the
debate, on a more general level the dialogue between
bioethics and psychoanalysis has been quite substantial
over the years, oscillating between congeniality and ani-
mosity and back. Both represent a discourse as well as a
practice in which assessments, diagnostics, interventions,
interpretations, casuistry, etc. play an important role. Also,
one could argue that, genealogically speaking, both
bioethics and psychoanalysis build on discursive practices
such as pastoral theology and the culture of confession,
while both assist their clients in distinguishing right from
wrong in complex and challenging situations. Moreover, as
Solbakk phrases it: Freud’s “fingerprints” can be found on
many bioethical terms, including the core concept of the
autonomous Self (2013, p. 319), but this also goes for
‘technophobia’, ‘ambivalence’ and ‘denial’.
In addition, various aspects of psychoanalytical practice
trigger analysis or even criticism from a bioethical view-
point. An intriguing example is the case of Dora, the first
extensive psychoanalytic case study published by Freud
(1905/1942), who in his Preface admits to publishing this
document (which contains a fair amount of intimate per-
sonal details concerning his former patient) without her
consent, arguing that patients would never opt for psy-
choanalytic treatment if they suspected that confidentiality
could thus be broken. Freud claimed that his duty as a
scientist (to share his finding, so that future therapists and
patients might profit from the insights gained) had to be
given more weight than discretional duties towards single
patients. And he took care to conceal Dora’s identity,
notably by using a pseudonym, although her identity was
nonetheless discovered (cf. Kochiras 2006). But again, my
objective is not to reconstruct the actual history of mutual
learning between bioethics and psychoanalysis, but rather
to add an additional section, focussing on the profile of
bioethics as a particular type of discourse. As indicated, the
starting point of such a comparative analysis is language.
Ethics and morality: the function of the signifier
Bioethics begins, I would argue, with individuals (moral
subjects) finding themselves confronted with particular
moral problem situations: biomedical dilemmas, for
example, or instances of gross injustice: anything which
arouses us from our usual free-floating indifference, forc-
ing us to come up with a response (be it a comment, a
judgment or a course of action).
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Let me elucidate this with a concrete example. In 1975,
while still a high school student, I saw the movie One ﬂew
over the Cuckoo’s Nest, set in a closed psychiatric hospi-
tal (Kesey 1962). Key protagonist Randle McMurphy is a
delinquent who feigned insanity to avoid serving a custo-
dial sentence and who largely lives by impulse, finding it
impossible to comply with rules, schedules or discipline of
any kind. He viscerally rejects authority and tries to violate,
subvert or outwit anyone who confines him and his appe-
tites in any way (Jennings 2010). But this time, he clearly
underestimated the entangling power of the total institution
he stumbled into: a psychiatric ward over which his
nemesis, Nurse Mildred Ratched, exercises autocratic
control. As the drama unfolds, a conflict seems inevitable,
especially when McMurphy ferments resistance among the
inmates, most of whom he believes to be sane people made
insane by being kept in an insane place, to paraphrase
Rosenhan (1973), as victims of Nurse Ratched’s stringent
regime. When one of the inmates (a highly insecure young
male, encouraged by McMurphy to have sex with a pros-
titute, for which he is subsequently reprimanded by Nurse
Ratched) commits suicide, McMurphy physically attacks
and almost strangles Ratched. As a result, he is loboto-
mised and surgically turned into a zombie, whereupon
another inmate (a huge, Native American named Chief
Bromden, who acts as the film’s narrator) makes his escape
by tearing a heavy washbowl from the wall and throwing it
through a window: an act of breaking-out, not only from
the building as such, but also from the psychiatric logic it
materialises.
I still vividly remember how the movie aroused in my
peers and me an incongruent mixture of fairly strong moral
responses. On the one hand, we clearly sympathised with
McMurphy, who led the revolt against the politics of
institutionalisation (a big issue in those days, when the
anti-psychiatry movement was at its peak) and who, as a
result, was involuntarily subjected to debilitating surgery,
irreversibly altering his personality and quality of life
(although I am sure we did not use any of these terms in our
debate). On the other hand, some of us also sympathised
with Nurse Ratched, who had fought desperately to sur-
vive, in a consistent effort to professionally manage an
almost impossible situation, surrounded by (often
intractable and potentially violent) males such as McMur-
phy: waiting for a moment of weakness on her part, or a
professional mistake, anything that would provide them
with an opportunity to strike.
The movie is very open to a psychoanalytic reading,
moreover,—staging a case of ‘masculine protest’ against a
powerful, intimidating woman, fuelled by castration anxi-
ety and ending with lobotomy, as a stand-in for
demasculinisation—, but let me focus on the bioethical
dimension for now. Seen from this perspective, the movie
enacts (in a highly dramatized, but nonetheless fairly con-
vincing manner) a basic dilemmawhich torments penitential
psychiatric practice up to this day, namely the tension
between on the one hand the principle of autonomy, implying
that invasive treatment is only legitimate if based on vol-
untary and informed consent (and beneficial to the patient)
and, on the other hand, the risk of (severe) harm to others:
McMurphy’s physical harassment of a senior professional,
his passage à l’acte, as Lacan (who actually was a forensic
psychiatrist himself) would phrase it.1
What is especially relevant, however, is that the moral
responses invoked in subjects like me (not yet contami-
nated by years of professional philosophical training) are
never purely visceral. They are never solely what etholo-
gists would call a fight-flight-or-freeze response. Visual
cues are important, no doubt, such as the Gestalt of the
intimidating Nurse Ratched, with her omniscient, cynical
gaze, contrasting sharply with the introvert silhouette of the
Native American Chief, whose stoic equanimity suddenly
gives way to his dramatic (and, to youngsters like me, quite
inviting) gesture of escape. But such visual elements evoke
responses which are nonetheless drenched in language:
clad in and pre-structured by the culturally available moral
labels and phrases currently in use, allowing us to literally
come to terms with them. In other words, over and above
mere physiological symptoms of anger or arousal, the
movie (as a moral ‘stimulus’) inevitably triggers an
assemblage of (often fragmentary) convictions, considera-
tions and ideas, provisionally casted in moral terminology.
Morality is not a matter of instinct, but permeated by
language from the very outset.
And this is where ethics as a critical exercise comes in.
How to transform muddled mixtures of ideas into a
coherent and convincing analysis? How to articulate moral
responses in such a way that they become consistent and
sustainable? Socrates, the founding father of ethics, tried to
do this by asking for moral reasons (Why? questions) and
subsequently, as soon a particular concept (x) was brought
in, by asking the (seemingly obvious) question What is x?
If someone would argue, for instance, that McMurphy
clearly had good reasons for physically harassing his foe,
or that the psychiatrists clearly had good reasons for
lobotomising their patient, Socrates would spur us to
articulate our ‘reasons’ more explicitly, so as to probe and
examine them. If someone argues, for instance, that an act
of injustice had been committed, resulting in a case of
suicide, or that McMurphy represented an otherwise
uncontainable threat to other patients, to staff members, or
even to the institution as a whole, Socrates would ask
1 In his dissertation Lacan analyses the case of Aime´e, a psychiatric
patient who, after writing two unsuccessful novels, stabbed a famous
actress with a knife (Lacan 1932).
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questions such as: What is justice? What is the purpose of a
penitentiary psychiatric institution? What is proper treat-
ment? Once questions of this kind are seriously addressed,
the impromptu moral debate becomes sublated into ethical
deliberation, and transposed from the realm of every-day
morality into the intellectual arena of conceptual analysis.
On this level, participants no longer simply state their
viewpoints, their ‘way of seeing things’. Rather, they
employ the calibrated vocabulary of ethics. The basic
handiwork of professional ethics consists in analysing,
clarifying and cleaning up a set of standardised terms, so as
to facilitate systematic deliberation.2 Ethical expertise
basically amounts to mastering a particular vocabulary, a
jargon if you like, a ϰοινὴ or lingua franca, developed for
the purpose of ethical diagnostics.
Or, to put it more explicitly in Lacanian terms: the
ethical process starts with imaginary items, with a Gestalt;
a tense empirical situation that triggers the imagination,
involving a protagonist whose (more or less stereotypical)
profile is bound to evoke specific reactions (of empathy or
anger). In animal life, the imaginary register is the domi-
nant one, but the human world is tainted by and saturated
with language (Zwart 2014). Furthermore, Lacan would
refer to the subsequent (interminable) handiwork of ethics
as the ‘symbolisation’ of moral experience: replacing
strong (provocative) images and phantasies by a network of
ratified terms and principles (the ‘symbolic order’). Thus,
bioethicists coin and refine the basic terms (‘signifiers’)
which allow for a systematic analysis and assessment
(‘domestication’) of subjective responses to complex moral
problem situations.
Lacan elucidates this relationship between ethical terms
and moral responses with the help of the algorithm (S/s),
where uppercase (S) refers to the signiﬁers (the ethical terms
produced and calibrated by professional ethicists) and low-
ercase (s) to the floating mass of experiences, emotions,
convictions and considerations evoked by moral problem
situations, emerging at the lower side of the bar (Lacan
1966a, p. 497). The former (the signifiers) are used to capture
and domesticate the latter (the signified), while the system of
signifiers (the terminological grid, the network of standard-
ised, stabilised and formalised conceptions, emerging at the
upper side of the bar) constitutes the symbolic order. This
grid (this network of signifiers) will neither be seamless, nor
fully consistent. There will always be something which we
fail to articulate or grasp, invoking uneasiness, giving rise to
symptoms of discontent in ethical discourse. Lacan refers to
this unspeakable remainder, this annoying discursive recal-
citrance as the Real, which notably reveals itself in moments
of trauma, inmoral tragedies for instance, when the gaps (the
blind spots) in the symbolic network are suddenly (and quite
painfully) laid bare.
To some extent, the imaginary is the realm of moral
intuitions or moral sensitivity: the ability to discern the
moral colouring of a situation, to have an eye for moral
cues. The confrontation with concrete situations may evoke
in us a range of positive or negative responses (from
empathy and admiration up to repugnance, indignation and
outrage). From a Lacanian perspective, however, our moral
responses to acute problem situations are never purely
spontaneous, purely ‘immediate’. Rather, morality pro-
vides a discursive ambiance, so that our responses are pre-
structured by language (the discourse of the Other). And
the subsequent process of symbolisation concurs with the
iconoclastic tendency (discernible in scientific discourse in
general, but in professional ethics as well) to replace
images with words, and to gradually move from concrete
situations (triggering intuitive moral responses) to more
abstract and elaborate logical arguments (revolving around
basic signifiers). In other words, symbolisation refers to the
tendency to move from concrete examples (also in the
sense of: exemplary individuals, idols, heroes, saints, vil-
lains, foes, etc.) towards standardised ethical terminology
(for instance: sets of virtues or principles). Thus, the
objective of bioethics, as an academic discipline, is to
progress from the level of the particular (the visible and
imaginable) towards the level of a professionally examined
and calibrated terminology; from the level of narratives and
parables towards the level of tested principles; and from
striving, faltering and concretely situated others (Ratched,
McMurphy, Bromden, etc.) to the symbolical order as the
language of the Other. Thus, the network of signifiers
(S) becomes increasingly able to articulate, structure and
contain the floating mass of convictions, intuitions and
ideas (s), notwithstanding the inherent tendency of the
signified (s) to evade the signifier’s grasp (S). For indeed:
moral experience keeps revealing the limited adequacy of
accepted signifiers, keeps pointing to other (obfuscated)
aspects, forcing ethicists to constantly adapt and refine their
terminological grid. In other words, the relationship
between signifier and signified remains highly precarious,
for although we (as professional ethicists) may think that
we ‘know’ what justice, autonomy, beneficence, etc. is, as
soon as we are confronted with genuine moral dilemmas, a
sense of embarrassment may again befall us. And although
the signifiers provide a certain hold on the problem,
offering moral guidance, the discord between our mastery
of the ethical vocabulary on the one hand and the persisting
uncertainty covered up by it on the other, is represented by
the bar (/) separating (S) from (s): S/s. This bar represents a
productive inhibition: we are continuously challenged but
also frustrated in our efforts to make ethical discourse
comply with our demands.
2 The word ‘term’ comes from the Latin terminus: i.e. the temporary
endpoint of a diachronic process.
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This distinction between the network of standard signi-
fiers (S) and the floating mass of considerations, intuitions,
convictions and ideas (s),—captured by the algorithm S/s
—, corresponds to the distinction between morality (s) and
ethics (S); or between “intuitive moral principles” and
“critical thinking” (Hare 1981). A similar distinction is
made in linguistics between actual, every-day language use
(by the anonymous masses of native speakers: ‘morality’)
and the formal rules and principles used to assess the
quality and correctness of this language use (‘ethics’).
Similar to ethics, linguistics is on the one hand a descrip-
tive science (describing actual language use), but on the
other hand a critical or even normative science, explaining
how language should be used (in accordance with certified
rules and principles).
An example of an ethicist using this analogy is John
Rawls (1972/1980) who, referring to the work of Chomsky
(1965), compares the sense of justice (which he presumes
present in all “educated individuals”) to the “sense of
grammaticalness” (i.e. the ability to produce or recognise
well-formed sentences) of native language users, while
comparing a full-fledged theory of justice to “explicit
grammatical knowledge” (1972/1980, p. 47). Professional
linguists aim to reconstruct the rules and principles which
are unconscious and inaccessible to ordinary language
users. This analogy provides another opportunity for fur-
thering the bioethics-psychoanalysis dialogue because
Lacan, in developing his S/s algorithm, likewise builds on
insights borrowed from linguistics, notably the work of
Ferdinand de Saussure (1957–1913), a contemporary of
Freud, although, rather than straightforwardly copying the
latter’s ideas, he adds some twists of his own (as we will
see).
Psychoanalysis, bioethics and linguistics
Lacan’s ambition was to reform psychoanalysis by con-
necting it with other twentieth-century research fields such
as linguistics, ethology and computational logic. He
intended to bring psychoanalysis on a par with modern
science, notably through formalisation, thus enforcing what
the (psychoanalytic) philosopher of science Bachelard
(1938/1947) called an epistemological rupture: i.e. a leap
from pre-scientific, intuitive forms of enquiry into system-
atic, stringent and formalised research (Lacan 1966a, p. 497).
In a famous essay entitled The Agency of the Letter in the
Unconscious, Lacan (1966a) explicitly sets out to elucidate
Freud’s work with the help of De Saussure’s linguistics
(and vice versa). According to De Saussure (1916/1968), a
linguistic sign (say: a word) is a bifacial phenomenon: an
association of (on the one hand) an acoustic or literal unit
(a series of sounds, a sequence of letters, an ideogram, etc.)
and (on the other hand) a concept or idea. For the former,
De Saussure suggests the term ‘signifier’ (signiﬁcant),
reserving the term ‘signified’ (signiﬁé) for the latter (1916/
1968, p. 99). Discourse is basically a sequence (a linear
chain) of linguistic elements, representable by the follow-
ing basic scheme (p. 159):
This linguistic system imposes itself on “speaking sub-
jects” as an enormous mass of (collectively ratified)
associations between signifier and signified, and De Saus-
sure emphasises that speaking subjects are radically unable
to challenge its tyranny, or to bring about significant
changes in the functioning of the linguistic order (p. 101).
In fact, speaking subjects are to a large extent “uncon-
scious” of the rules that govern the language system and
determine their speech and thoughts (p. 106).
Linguistic phenomena can be studied from two per-
spectives, moreover, namely synchronically (studying
language as a system, at a particular historical moment in
time, for instance: the present) and diachronically (studying
the ways in which language systems evolve over time,
focussing on what De Saussure refers to as linguistic
‘displacements’ or events).
Linguistic changes occur continuously. Basically, they
are displacements (‘de´placements’) in the association (re-
lationship, ‘rapport’) between signifier and signified. A
signifier itself may change (a particular letter or sound may
be substituted, or dropped, for instance) or a signifier may
become detached from a particular signified and recon-
nected with another. But again, speaking subjects are
usually unaware of such alternations, occurring “subcon-
sciously” (p. 163, p. 171). Linguistic idiosyncrasies (such
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as: exceptions to the rules of grammar) are usually
“symptoms” (p. 232) of previous displacements which
occurred somewhere in the past, but again, as a rule
speaking subjects are hardly conscious of the diachronic
dimension of their language at all (which is usually
“repressed”).
Language, moreover, is basically a system of (discrete)
differences (between sounds, letters, characters, etc.),
allowing for differentiation. As an example, De Saussure
mentions the words ‘father’ and ‘mother’ (père and mère in
French, p. 167), where a difference of just one consonant
corresponds with the difference in gender. Thus, the
absence or presence of a particular “member” or “articu-
lus” (p. 156) allows for a specific connection between
signifier and signified.
Lacan’s aim of merging psychoanalysis with linguistics
(Freud with De Saussure) is evidently facilitated by the fact
that the latter uses so many terms which are part of the
psychoanalytic vocabulary as well;—such as ‘association’
(Assoziation), ‘displacement’ (Verschiebung), ‘uncon-
scious’ (Unbewusst), ‘resistance’, rapport, the ‘speaking
subject’, etc. For Lacan, this points to a more basic con-
gruence between both fields. De Saussure’s work, he
argues, allows us to articulate more precisely what psy-
choanalysis really is about. It is unfortunate that The
Interpretation of Dreams was published 16 years before De
Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics appeared in print
(1966a, b, p. 513). Had Freud known De Saussure’s lin-
guistic theories, Lacan surmises, he undoubtedly would
have used them, not only in view of his keen interest in
linguistic phenomena,—such as slips of the tongue (Freud
1917/1940), language jokes (1905/1940), etymology
(1910/1943) and, of course, the role of letters, words,
phrases, cryptograms, rebuses and other literal elements in
dreams, as the “royal road” towards making the uncon-
scious readable (1900/1942)—, but first and foremost
because the key target of psychoanalysis are the signifiers
produced by patients (‘analysants’) in their efforts to
articulate their symptoms, their inhibitions, their anxieties,
their desire.
For Lacan, linguistics is crucially important because it
allows him to address a number of fatal misunderstandings
which infected psychoanalytic discourse, notably con-
cerning the nature of the unconscious and the position of
the subject. The unconscious is not the seat of (pre-lin-
guistic, untamed, animalistic, egoistic) “instincts” (1966a,
p. 495), but rather structured like a language: the “dis-
course of the Other” (p. 524), preceding and
predetermining the subject (p. 495), so that the latter is not
the autonomous, rational, self-realising, choosing entity of
ego psychology (and of behavioural economics), trying to
ward off the unconscious instincts with the help of various
mechanisms of defence. Rather, the subject is a product of
the elementary structures and permutations of language.
Let me elucidate this with the help of a classic example
from ethical discourse, the case of Antigone, the heroine of
the Greek tragedy written by Sophocles (around 441 B.C.)
which explicitly stages an (unsolvable?) conflict between
two types of normative claims, referred to by Hegel (1807/
1986, p. 322, p. 348, 1821/1970, p. 257, p. 294) as human
and divine Law. In contrast to the former, the latter is
unwritten and eternal and instead of questioning its legiti-
macy (which would already represent an act of infidelity)
subjects are expected to stubbornly persevere (“verharren”;
Hegel 1807/1986, p. 322) in their loyalty to the divine Law
at all costs. From a Lacanian perspective, Antigone is not
driven by a kind of sororal clan instinct, set into motion
by the disgusting image of her brother’s unburied corpse,
left behind on the battlefield, but rather by her conscience,
that is: by divine Law, by the voice of the Other; a
demonic incitement, imposing itself on her, coming from
‘elsewhere’ (i.e. the unconscious), clad in the linguistic
form of an unwritten law and fuelling an inescapable
clash with the Theban authorities and their written laws.
In fact, Sophocles’ Antigone is the text where the signifier
‘autonomy’ (αὑτ ό νομος) is used for the very first time
(Zwart 1993). From a Lacanian perspective, however, it is
clear that she is not making ‘her own free choice’ (in the
modern sense of ‘self-determination’). Rather, her fatal
(and extremely unprofitable) craving to adhere to this
unwritten law is imposed on her by an ‘extimate’ calling,
as Lacan would phrase it: both intimate (coming from
within, and therefore un-ignorable) and external (coming
from ‘elsewhere’). It is a silent voice, which nonetheless
cries out, a decisive instigation, resulting in her fatal
passage à l’acte.
For contemporary readers, it has become difficult to
really experience the excessive, demonic nature of Anti-
gone’s divine calling because the signifier autonomy has
been affected by a series of rather drastic displacements. If
we follow its trajectory diachronically (through history) it
is clear that nowadays the term no longer refers to the same
‘signified’ as in ancient Greece (Zwart 1993). In Kant, for
instance, ‘autonomy’ means acting in accordance with the
law of reason (as a rational agent), which is quite unlike the
opaque, unfathomable (‘irrational’, heathenish) divine
injunction to which Antigone commits herself. And in
contemporary morality, ‘autonomy’ has acquired a rather
liberal meaning, something like: acting in accordance with
one’s own predilections. Nonetheless, the ancient associa-
tion with pre-modern ideas is unconsciously retained, so
that we are less free (less modern) than we think; still
driven by extimate, opaque injunctions (at times resurging
as the return of the repressed).
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The primacy of the signifier: speaking subjects and
speaking masses
Thus, for Lacan, the rereading of psychoanalysis with the
help of De Saussure’s linguistics rehabilitates Freud’s
original insights, distorted by later vulgarisations, notably
the insight that the moral subject is not an autonomous ego,
but rather a chronically divided entity, torn between
incommensurable normative claims. On the one hand, the
subject is faced with what De Saussure refers to as the
“speaking masses” (p. 112), comparable to what Heidegger
(1927/1986) refers to as Das Gerede or Das Man: the moral
chorus, voicing the accepted (‘ratified’) precepts of
morality, the generally acknowledged associations between
signifier and signified, institutionalised as ‘human law’. On
the other hand, there is a different chain of associations
between signifier and signified, coming ‘from elsewhere’,
as Antigone (the ancient Greek ‘analysant’) phrases it:
another language, a different truth. And it is precisely be-
cause Kreon so rigorously forbids her to live up to her
extimate calling, that the desire to act in accordance with
her truth (captured by the inspiring signifier autonomy)
becomes so irresistible.
De Saussure likewise pointed out that the dual nature of
linguistic phenomena (as a series of associations between
signifier and signified) corresponds to the duality of human
personhood: with the ‘signifier’ representing the external
dimension (vocal sounds, writing, etc.) and the ‘signified’
representing the internal (psychic) dimension (p. 145). And
whereas speaking subjects dwell in language as an
imposing collective system of associations, there is an
“inner treasure” (171) of idiosyncratic associations which
is individually unique and may be brought to the fore via
(interminable) processes of working-through (such as
psychoanalysis or autobiographic writing).
Thus, Lacan uses De Saussure to rectify, but also to
radicalise and recast the Freudian heritage, but the reverse
is also true: he uses Freud to recast and radicalise lin-
guistics. For rather than merely treading in De Saussure’s
footsteps, some displacements are effectuated as well, and
by far the most noteworthy one involves the algorithm S/s
as such. For whereas De Saussure placed the signiﬁed
(s) on top of the bar and the signiﬁer (S) underneath [s/S],
Lacan reverses their positions [S/s]. Although this is not
immediately at odds with De Saussure’s theory (because,
according to the latter, their position, either above or below
the bar, is arbitrary), it nonetheless rather outspokenly
reveals Lacan’s intention of emphasising the autonomy, the
primacy, the commanding authority, the ‘tyranny’ even of
the signifier (in accordance with psychoanalytic experi-
ence), while at the same time underscoring the
“heteronomy” (p. 524), the dependence, the thraldom of the
moral subject vis-a`-vis the symbolic order. Thus, Lacan
advocates a ‘literalisation’ of the subject as a product of the
‘play of signifiers’, haunted by language, with the para-
doxical result that in Lacanian psychoanalysis the (moral)
subject is initially eclipsed (by the omnipresent power of
structures and systems), but subsequently reinstalled (as the
speaking subject who desperately takes the floor to artic-
ulate (in a frantic, polemical dialogue with the discourse of
the Other) the call of unconscious desire tormenting him or
her.
Besides the unconscious and the subject, Saussurean
linguistics allows Lacan to clarify a third decisive dimen-
sion of psychoanalysis, and of bioethics, namely sexual
difference. As pointed out, De Saussure sees language as a
system of differences, exemplified by (the presence or
absence of) specific components. From a Lacanian per-
spective, it is no coincidence that De Saussure uses père
and mère to elucidate this because language is imbued by
sexual difference, notably in the form of male and female
(vs. neuter) nouns. Psychoanalytically speaking, the con-
sonants p and m became associated with the presence or
absence of a particular member (or articulus, as De Saus-
sure phrases it) in male or female as signified concepts.
This also highlights an importance difference between
Lacan and Freud. For whereas Freud connects sexual
phenomena surfacing in psychoanalytic practice (such as:
castration anxiety, fetishism, penis envy and the like) with
the absence or presence of physical, corporeal items (with
‘members’ in the organic, anatomical sense of the term),
for Lacan the phallus is basically a signifier. In other
words, Lacan takes the phallus literally, which may sound
cryptic, but can easily be explained. For Lacan (1966a, b,
p. 499), the perfect exemplification of the functioning of
the phallus is the following:
Men Women
It is the ‘authority’ of the signifier (Men vs. Women)
which imposes “urinary gender segregation” (p. 500) on
individuals who find themselves away from home (on
airports or in cafe´s), even if no physical difference can be
detected between the two separate rooms (where men and
women are temporarily kept in isolation), nor between the
two lavatories to which the twin doors provide access (as in
principle, there is nothing definitely ‘male’ or ‘female’ to a
standard WC). Still, the signifier clearly states that
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men ≠ women, separating them into two parallel “proces-
sions” (p. 500).
Subsequently, sexual segregation (imposed by the phallic
signifier) may function as a model for other forms of dif-
ferentiation, such as age (at what age is someone entitled to
give or withhold consent?), or time schedules (when is it
allowed to enter a certain building?), or nationality (when is a
particular individual entitled to certain health care facili-
ties?). In the latter case, for instance, nationality is a ‘literal’
issue, indicated by a signifier, present or absent in printed
documents such as passports, connected to systems of sig-
nifiers, in short: the symbolical order, rather than to
something physical (as nationality is not immediately dis-
cernible in someone’s ‘genetic passport’). Likewise,
biomedical signifiers (indicators, markers) allow us to seg-
regate the normal from the pathological.
Corporeal elements such as penises and breasts, due to
their appendix-like form, in combination with the fact that
they are present in some and absent in others (and therefore
detachable to some extent from the body as a whole), may
provide a starting point for differentiation. Indeed, the
existence of sexual difference is (one of) the first (unset-
tling) discoveries made by very young children. Perhaps at
a certain point in history there was a more direct link
between a particular signifier (say, q or l) and a specific
member in the corporeal sense, similar to how the letter A
(once shaped as ∀, aleph) originally functioned as an
pictogram of an ox. Still, Lacan emphatically endorses the
Saussurean viewpoint that signifiers are arbitrary and in no
way refer to (or resemble) real things.3 In other words, the
signifier produces segregation, produces male and female
subjects, as well as healthy citizens and psychiatric
patients. But this is the signifier’s typical mode of opera-
tion: structuring the world by introducing dichotomies, also
in the moral domain, between good versus evil, ethical
versus unethical, legal versus illegal, compulsory versus
voluntary, virtuous versus vicious, significant versus
insignificant, absence versus presence (of informed consent
forms or codicils for instance), etc.
Thus, ethics as a system of signifiers propagates
dichotomisation, thereby introducing a semblance of order,
although actually, as moral deliberation continues to pro-
ceed and moral culture continues to evolve, the anchoring
points (points de capiton; Lacan 1966a, b, p. 503) between
the terminological grid (the signifiers) and the floating
mass of convictions and experiences (the signified) remain
highly precarious. The signified will continue to evade the
grasp of the signifier, so that eventually nothing stops the
incessant sliding of meaning (Lacan 1966a, b, p. 502;
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 1973/1992). Indeed, as Niet-
zsche (1881/1969, p. 1012) phrased it, even to ask
questions concerning established conceptions of good and
evil inevitably amounts to questioning them, thereby, per-
haps unwittingly, subverting or loosening the fragile
linguistic rapport between S (the signifier) and s (the
incessantly sliding mass of opinions and ideas).
In view of the primordial position of the ethical signifiers
(as weighty words), one cannot afford to use them too
loosely. Rather, they must be taken to the letter, and it is not
allowed to replace a signifier like ‘autonomy’ by other terms
which may seem to come quite close (such as ‘liberty’, ‘in-
dependency’, ‘emotional stability’, etc.). Although such
displacements easily occur in every-day moral discussions,
in ethics (due to the careful handiwork of professional ethi-
cists) key signifiers have acquired a rather stringentmeaning,
in connection with other linguistic elements within the sys-
tem, so that one should take care to use them literally.
Furthermore, signifiers such as ‘autonomy’ or ‘justice’ are
not to be mistaken for descriptions of actual states of affairs
(‘autonomy’ as a characteristic of a particular human being),
but rather as performative imperatives, summoning someone
to become autonomous, or to become committed to justice,
guiding subjects in this direction, but also operating as a
constant reminder of our inevitable failure to really live up to
these commanding expectations. And that is why we, as
moral subjects, notwithstanding the warning uttered above,
are always on the look-out for smoother substitutes, less
burdenedwith etymological, cultural ormoral heritages,—e.
g. ‘self-determination’ as a (smoother, less commanding)
alternative for ‘autonomy’.
Lacan connects displacement with ‘metonymy’, again a
term adopted from linguistics. Displacement/metonymy
may function as a mechanism of defence against the harsh
censorship exercised by our ruthless conscience, operating as
an over-demanding, hyper-critical, ‘extimate’ voice or gaze.
Metonymy may blunt the signifier’s cutting edge and evade
its suffocating grasp. Subjects may even become fixated on
their terminological alternatives, allowing them to tem-
porarily evade the disquieting truth conveyed by the original,
harsher term (p. 518). Thus, metonymy becomes part of the
symbolical rhetoric of bioethical discourse (Lundberg 2012).
It is primarily by carefully choosing their terms, by prefer-
ring neutralising and politically correct euphemisms over
provocative labels, or vice versa, for instance, that partici-
pants position themselves vis-a`-vis the symbolical order:
genetic modification or manipulation?; euthanasia or mercy
killing?; GM crops or Frankenstein food?; animal testing or
vivisection?; bioethical principles or Georgetown mantra?;
etc. And yet, Lacan argues, linguistic engineering (and this
includes the careful conceptual handiwork of academic
ethics)will never put an end, once and for all, to the linguistic
struggles and confusions holding sway in the opera-buffa
3 Unlike specific (iconic) symbols, which tend to retain some
connection with tangible items (such as the balance, as a symbol
for justice).
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humaine of moral or social life (p. 526). Even Stalin (1950)
had to admit that, notwithstanding the disruptive transfor-
mations unleashed by theOctober revolution (the demolition
of the pre-revolutionary cultural superstructure), the Russian
language remained more or less the same, although some
phrases were added and some words were dropped (Lacan
1966a, b, p. 496).
The topology of the moral landscape (I, S and R)
Linguistics provides a ‘royal’ bridge between psychoanal-
ysis and bioethics, allowing us to explore the relationship
between the subject and the system of signifiers, the sym-
bolical order. From a Lacanian perspective, however, this
is only one of three dimensions of the moral landscape,
namely the Imaginary, the Symbolical and the Real (ISR).
I already briefly referred to these dimensions above. Ini-
tially, we respond to provocative images, such as the
claustrophobic fac¸ade of the psychiatric building or the
intimidating Gestalt of the Nurse, and the various phantasies
and scripts to which they give rise. But before long, the
ensuing moral discussion becomes increasingly verbal, with
the help of terms and phrases, although such deliberations
(either spontaneous or formalised) will prove unable to
address the case to the full, due to a stubborn, annoying,
inarticulate remainder: the ungraspable Real. Together, I,
S and R constitute the ‘topology’ of the moral landscape.
The Imaginary may refer to pronounced examples of
wrongfulness, or to utopian visions of healthy human bodies
flourishing in peaceful societies, as a source of inspiration.
Lacan (1955–1956/1981) mentions ancient statues of Greek
and Roman athletes erected for the purpose of moral pro-
paganda, but one could also think of Soviet posters depicting
vigorous men and women of the future, or commercial
advertisements depicting superbly healthy individuals who
used the right diet or just recovered from a successful kidney
transplant. Billboards displaying happy organ recipients in
pro-donation campaigns (or transgender mannequins in
fashion magazines) may be highly seductive, convincing
enough us to make us enlist as donors for instance, but they
may also raise suspicion: will organ transplantation (or
transgender surgery) really achieve full recovery of the
recipient’s integrity and health?
By asking such questions, we already enter the sym-
bolical order, the grid of operational signifiers, of weighty,
value-laden terms and imperatives, of operative guiding
principles and the regulations build around them: in other
words, everything Hegel refers to as Sittlichkeit. From a
Lacanian point of view, bioethics as a discourse reflects the
primacy of the signifier (S) vis-a`-vis the steady stream of
everyday moral associations and considerations (s). It was
only after the term ‘autonomy’ was established (to capture
a particular set of ideas) that this concept could be sys-
tematically worked through. Or take Kant’s famous essay
What is Enlightenment? in which he manages to make a
diffuse idea discrete and precise, pointing out what
Enlightenment (Aufklärung) really is (Kant 1784/1971). In
other words, the signifier stabilises, but to a certain extent
even precedes the actual meaning of the term. Kant’s
Critique of Practical Reasoning is an extremely unpractical
work; focussing solely on ethical grammar (the operative
force of key terms such as ought and should), far removed
from the fuzzy, diffuse casuistry of everyday existence.
Nonetheless, such normative terms, once established, may
structure moral situations, acting as vectors, putting us on
the track of interpretations and interventions. The signifier
‘injustice’ basically means that something should be done
about the situation.
Thirdly, there is the dimension of the Real (not to be
confused with reality: i.e. that which is actually perceived
and experienced, a particular moral problem situation for
instance). The Real is that which persistently resists sym-
bolisation, remains impossible to articulate, revealing itself
quite unexpectedly, in the form of meaningless, pointless
disasters for instance (such as a sudden lethal illness,
caused by a genetic defect), but also tragic conflicts
exemplify the intrusion of the Real, disrupting the smooth
discursive process. The basic objective of symbolisation is
to put an end to moral ambiguity and to liberate moral
subjects from the perplexities of incompatible moral
claims, but (according to Lacan) this interminable process
will never be completed. As soon as we reach consensus,
new discordances and anomalies are bound to erupt. Still,
although the symbolic order fails to resolve our problems
and its guidance proves limited, we cannot do without.
Should the conviction that our daily activities are basically
legitimate evaporate, moral paralysis would immediately
set in. Even criminal, violent acts need justification: an
areole of moral words and phrases.
The fourfold of bioethical discourse
Lacan’s final step is to radicalise the process of symbolisa-
tion through formalisation: i.e. the effort to capture key
concepts in mathematical symbols and algorithms, known as
mathemes. A first example was already discussed above,
namely the algorithm of signification (S/s). While the
dimensions I, S and R constitute his topology, the mathemes
(and the symbolical elements from which they are com-
posed) constitute Lacan’s algebra (Assoun 2003, p. 61).
Lacan’s starting point is the divided (craving) subject,
exposed to (haunted by) conflicting yet imposing demands;
in Lacanian algebra: $. In sharp contrast to neo-liberal
trends in current bioethical discourse, the Lacanian subject
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is not at all the autonomous, choosing, self-conscious Self,
bent on self-realisation. Quite the contrary, $ is paralysed
by uncertainties, pestered by a sense of deficiency and
impotence, suffering from a basic inability or lack (in
Lacanian algebra: −φ), always on the look-out for some-
thing which may relieve his/her problems by restoring a
sense of competence and wholeness. Lacan refers to this
inexorable, missing, life-saving ‘something’ as the object
a, the object-cause of desire: that which will allegedly
suture the gap or lack (in algebraic symbols: a/−φ).
The relationship between ‘subject’ ($) and ‘object’
(a) can be captured with the help of the so-called matheme
of desire: $ ◊ a, where $ and a are separated/connected by a
lozenge, an operator pointing in both directions, thereby
indicating that the (impossible) object a is both the target
and the cause of human craving. In bioethics, this missing
object (a) may fuel the quest for (questionable) substitutes,
such as the panacea (the golden bullet, the perfect pros-
thesis, the wonder drug, the unique ingredient, the
compatible organ, purporting to make us whole again) or
the perfectly implantable and/or wearable gadget, the
smooth enhancer, allowing craving subjects to flourish
once again, to overcome their short-comings and to live up
to social (notably professional and sexual) expectations.
Two other important algebraic symbols are S1 (the
Master signifier, the authoritative, imposing word of the
Other) and S2: the chain of signifiers, in other words
knowledge, although S2 may also refer to the expert, the
custodian or spokesperson of this knowledge. With the help
of this set of symbols (S1, S2, $ and a), Lacan constructs
four schematic structures, representing four basic types of
discourse (Lacan 1969–1970/1991), the “summary and
summit” of his oeuvre (Verhaeghe 2001). The four basic
symbols (variables) may be inserted (in a fixed sequence: $,
S1, S2 and a) in one of the four positions in a rotating,
revolving, quadruped scheme:
Agent Other 
Truth Product  
In this manner, four discourses are generated.
The Master’s discourse is oriented towards the teachings
of the Master (S1 as agent), whose name provides a guar-
antee of truth (such as, for instance, Hippocrates or
Aristotle). The phrase Aristotle dixit (‘Aristotle said’)
functions as truth certificate, adding weight to insights or
statements attributed to this privileged source. The starting
point (the speaking agent) is the Master, producer of the
imposing signifier, the word of the Other (S1),
4 addressing
the scholarly reader (the philological expert, the curator of
theMaster’s intellectual heritage) as ‘other’ (S2 in the upper-
right position). The repressed truth (lower-left position) of
this type of discourse is the awareness that the Master surely
must have been a doubting and divided subject himself ($), a
dimensionwhich is obfuscated, that is: hidden underneath (at
the reverse side of) the bar. Although the experts seem to
function merely as servants, the Master (like in the case of
Hegel’s dialectics) becomes increasingly dependent on their
labour, and the authoritative insights (S1) can only maintain
their commanding presence because they are constantly
commemorated, re-polished and updated by the servants,
whose discursive dexterity continues to increase, so that in
the end the Master’s discourse completely relies on their
scholarly activities for survival, while eventually it is the
scholarly expertwhowill determinewhat theMaster actually
said (distinguishing between what is to be maintained,
underscored or ignored):
S1 S2
$ a
In contemporary academia, the contours of the Master’s
discourse may be discerned in the philosophical genre
known as ‘author studies’; devoted to actualising and vin-
dicating the writings of authoritative authors such as
Hippocrates or Aristotle. Initially, theMaster signifier seems
to give rise to a servile (philological, apologetic) discourse,
wholly oriented toward explaining, elucidating and vener-
ating the textual fragments and sayings of the Other. Yet,
although this type of discourse may seem tedious, unprof-
itable and of limited societal relevance to outsiders, it
produces a singular form of jouissance (a), thus providing an
intellectual bonus, only accessible for those who really
indulge in it. Moreover, unexpectedly perhaps, valuable
insights, even for the present, may come from this committed
return to the authoritative beginning, this fidelity to the
original truth event: the untainted articulation of the inau-
gural Word.
The second type of discourse is University discourse, a
logical next step, in view of the increased autonomy and
power of the servant, pointed out above. Now, the starting
point (agent) is the expert (S2) who, allegedly, refuses to
accept any other authority besides scientific evidence and
rational argumentation. In other words, the (unconscious,
inspirational, authoritative) voice of the Other (S1), sum-
moning the plodding, servile subject to produce more
knowledge, is repressed, concealed or hidden from view
(removed to the reverse side of the bar). It also means that
(servile) reading practices give way to experimentation, by
experts who take the process of truth production literally
into their own autonomous, dexterous hands. Typically,
university experts tend to devote their whole professional
4 To paraphrase the Gospel of Saint John: In principio erat verbum, et
verbum erat apud Magistrum.
H. Zwart
123
career to unravelling one particular privileged ‘object’ (be
it a virus, a molecule, an elementary particle, a mathe-
matical problem, a work of art or, in the case of bioethics, a
particular ethical concept or problem, although by way of
displacement the expert may also become fixated on a
derivative objective, a citation index (h-score) for instance,
or some other ‘perverse incentive’ at work in the current
research arena. Such objects absorb all of the expert’s
energy and time, at the expense of everything else, in the
hope that, in the end, truth may be revealed, or academic
prestige may finally be granted. But often, this unique
target of the researcher’s cupido sciendi (the subject’s Will
to Know) will prove a toxic, addictive lure and the
unforeseen side-effect of this discourse often is a deadlock
of personal malaise ($), so that the individual researcher
actually becomes a victim of science, due to lack of
response and acknowledgement, or because the object
proves an evaporating fiction, or because the effort simply
cannot be sustained. A classic example of course is Faust
who, at the height of a promising scholarly career, sud-
denly succumbs to a mid-life crisis, so that his pupil
Wagner continues and completes his work, but Lacan
mentions a whole series of victims of science, including
what seem to be highly successful researchers and heroes
of science (J.R. Mayer, Boltzmann, Cantor, etc.: Lacan
1966b, p. 870). Biographies of famous scientists, allegedly
success stories, are often tainted by severe experiences of
failure, despair and fraud; the history of science as hystory
(Verhaeghe 2001, p. 30):
S2 a
S1 $
This brings us to the third type of discourse (the third
discursive ‘quadruped’), namely the hysteric’s discourse (or
hysterical discourse), although this label should not be
taken in a pejorative sense. Now, the divided, craving
subject ($) vehemently takes the floor, raising a voice of
protest (Stop scientific misconduct! Power to the patient!
Self-determination!) to critically address the Master: an
authoritative figure on duty, a representative of established
discourse, whose system of signifiers is criticised and
questioned. What is repressed/obfuscated is the object a,
the true cause of the subject’s desire, fuelling the subject’s
(often misdirected and therefore insatiable) manifest cri-
tique. This genre of discourse figures prominently in
societal debates on technological issues (such as, for
instance, genetic modification). As an unexpected product
(side-effect), however, new questions may be asked, new
avenues for research may be opened up, so that new
insights may be generated (S2 in the lower-right position):
$ S1
a S2
A strength of the hysteric’s discourse often is its acute
seismographic sensitivity towards the undercurrents of
social life, about to erupt. The movie One ﬂew over the
Cuckoo’s nest adheres to this structure, as a supportive
voice endorsing the anti-psychiatry movement (Cooper
1967). The question is, however, whether such a crusade
against authority will prove a viable strategy. Its blind spot
is a lack of awareness of what is really pushing individuals
such as Randle McMurphy forward: the object-cause of
their desire (their object a).
But to bring this relationship between $ and a to the fore,
we need tomake another leap and enter a fourth discourse (or
quadruped), namely the discourse of the analyst, a para-
doxical term, since (ideally) the analyst is the one who does
not speak, but rather listens, with evenly-poised attention.
But precisely because of the analyst’s self-constraint, the
floor is now open to the subject’s repressed desire, provoked
by the object a: that which stalks the divided subject ($ in the
upper-right position, challenged by a). In order for this type
of discourse to unfold, however, knowledge and expertise
(S2) must be suspended (Docta ignorantia, learned igno-
rance). Rather than interpreting and analysing the subjects’
problems, the analyst must invite the actors themselves to
discover the cause of their malaise, the content of their true
desire. Historically, this type of discourse was inaugurated
by Socrates. As an unexpected side-effect, however, the
analyst (Socrates, Freud, Lacan, etc.) may unwillingly be
placed in the position of the Master (S1 in the lower-right
position), producing new instances of venerating serfdom (as
in the case of the Freudian movement, for instance, often
criticised for systematically imbuing conformism and
ostracising ‘deviationism’):
a $
S2 S1
Bioethics may assume any of these four roles and,
depending on time and context, its discursive profile may
significantly shift. Jan Helge Solbakk, for instance, in the
essay which was cited in the beginning of this paper, argues
that, whereas academic bioethics in its infancy “lent its ear
to the silenced voices in our societies”, today’s bioethics
“is using its intellectual and moral skills to serve the
interests of the most powerful voices in our societies”
(Solbakk 2013, p. 320). Instead of “speaking truth to
power”, it has become “a handmaiden within the medico-
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industrial complex, a governance tool”. In other words,
according to Solbakk, the structure of bioethical discourse
has been reversed, from the discourse of the hysteric (ad-
vocating issues, speaking truth to power) into university
discourse, so that the agent’s ethical expertise (once a mere
by-product) is now prominently on display, with experts
presenting themselves as the ones who are supposed to
know. Bioethicists can be consulted as articulate,
acknowledged experts (S2) who have achieved fluent
mastery of the official ethical vernacular, helping lay per-
sons to distinguish between valid and invalid arguments,
between proper (ratified) and improper terms (the latter
should be replaced via metonymy or banned).
Bioethicists may also continue to play the role of
advocate, however, committed to a particular, singular
cause, so that bioethics reflects the structure of hysterical
discourse, a symptom of which is the predilection for
theatrical gestures, for ‘acting out’, emphatically seeking
media attention, so as to put neglected or obfuscated issues
on the agenda. Hysterical discourse definitely aims to enter
the Master’s field of vision and is bent on catching the eye
and ear of powerful players. It is the discourse of the
whistle blower, of advocates of patient rights, calling for
liberation, sometimes using their own physical body as a
screen or text. Animal activists, for instance, in their pro-
tests against the use of laboratory animals in biomedical
research, may resort to corporeal gestures, chain them-
selves physically to a research facility’s fence, raise their
voice with the help of graffiti, spread noisy messages via
megaphones or social media, or paint signifiers (as excla-
mation marks) on their naked skin, thus calling attention to
(what they regard as) unheeded suffering and obfuscated
injustice: the adolescent stage, perhaps, of a moral debate
which, gradually, may become more manageable (once the
“native hue of resolution is sicklied o’er with the pale cast
of thought”). The hysteric’s discourse is part of a long
tradition of popular and intellectual protest, relying on
provocative gestures and interventions, making full use of
‘body language’, nowadays in vogue in movements such as
Femen, but actually going back (diachronically speaking)
to the ancient cynics: a bold, impertinent, popular, gay,
practical, provocative, theatrical, grotesque and decidedly
non-academic form of moral critique (Sloterdijk 1983). In
the end, however, the hysteric subject not only challenges
the Master, but also depends on him, demands his presence.
See for instance Lacan’s famous response to the hysteria of
the 1968 student uprising, arguing that these students were
actually longing for an omnipotent master: the obfuscated
desire of Maoist protest (1969–1970/1991).
From a Lacanian perspective, however, bioethics even-
tually should aspire to play the role of ‘analyst’, heeding
the discourse of various speaking subjects with evenly-
poised attention, waiting for symptoms and signifiers to
surface, as basic constituents for a diagnostics of the pre-
sent. The analyst’s discourse builds on the insight that
speaking subjects, occupying the upper-left position, as
Masters (S1), experts (S2) or hysterics ($), only apparently
act as agents: they are spoken and driven by desire, by a
truth unknown to themselves (Verhaeghe 2001). From the
analyst’s perspective, moreover, even the (apparently
‘negative’) figure of the hysteric actually plays a positive
role, revealing gaps in established discourse, highlighting
blind spots or deliberative routines which rightfully invoke
objections, because something of importance has been
forgotten or eclipsed, something of value which now has
become impossible to articulate. And in the case of uni-
versity discourse, the analyst focusses on symptoms of
professional uncertainty, ambivalence and unease, camou-
flaged by the expert’s apparent fluency and subtlety: Mind
the gap! (Verhaeghe 2001). In other words: the analyst as a
rhetorician, an expert in the dynamics and modes of dis-
course (Lundberg 2012; Lacan 1977–1978, p. 4).
Interestingly, Lacan’s four discourses overlap to some
extent with the four roles for bioethicists (or, more gen-
erally: for academics involved in Ethical, Legal and Social
Aspects research) as described by sociologist Wieser
(2011) on the basis of empirical research, namely: scholars
(analysing debates from an academic distance); collabo-
rators (presenting themselves as expert partners in
interdisciplinary research); advocates (emphatically taking
a position in the debate); and facilitators (creating a social
space for dialogue). In these four roles, the contours of the
Master’s discourse, the university discourse, the hysteric’s
discourse and the analyst’s discourse can easily be
discerned.
This does not imply that bioethics should strive to
coincide with the analyst’s discourse completely and
continuously. Quite the contrary, the analyst’s discourse
would become shallow and empty if bereft of experiences
(‘input’) gained from the other three discourses. Bioethi-
cists may play various roles within the ethical spiral or
cycle, leaping stepwise from the Master’s discourse (for
instance: introducing students to the Hippocratic oath) to
the university discourse (presenting bioethics as a spe-
cialised form of expertise) to hysterical discourse (calling
attention to dysfunctional, obscene gaps) up to the ana-
lyst’s discourse (reading the symptoms, discerning the
obfuscated truth in the folds and margins of the main-
stream debate) and from there back to the first position:
rereading master-thinkers such as Aristotle, Kant, Hegel
or Heidegger, to reclaim forgotten signifiers that may
allow us to strengthen our sensitivity and articulacy. I will
now further elucidate these four discourses (these four
discursive quadrupeds) with the help of two bioethical
‘files’, namely human reproduction and the research ani-
mal debate.
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First exemplification: human reproduction
Myfirst exemplification concerns a bioethical arena which is
actually quite close to psychoanalysis’s own preoccupations,
namely human reproductive technologies. Freud (1898/
1952) himself devoted one of his most bioethical papers to
this topic, published in the Wiener Klinische Rundschau, a
scholarly magazine for medical practitioners, arguing that
professional physicians have an ethical duty to take an
enlightened stance towards sexuality as amajor causal factor
in psychic malaise, although this undoubtedly may bring
them into conflict with traditional morality. Freud here
speaks as an expert, discussing causes and treatments of
ailments (such as hysteria and neurasthenia) in clinical,
professional terms, claiming expertise (S2 in the upper-left
position as agent), supported by an enlightened world-view
(S1 in the lower left position) and expressing the hope that
one day, biomedical science will triumphantly take control
over sperm and ova (as elusive objects a) by developing
contraceptives, thereby effectively separating sexuality from
reproduction, furthering sexual emancipation and reducing
psychic malaise (p. 507). In other words: Freud (on this
occasion) primarily represents the type of discourse referred
to by Lacan as university discourse:
However, as the anticipated triumph over natural pro-
creation gradually shifted “from utopia to science” (Zwart
2009), psychoanalytic discourse now proliferates in more
than one direction. University discourse continues, although
Freud’s blatant optimism is increasingly counter-acted by
voices that highlight possible mental downsides of a scien-
tific take-over of reproduction ($ in the lower-right position).
Yet, other sections of the “psychoanalytic establish-
ment” (especially in countries such as France) rather opt
for a return to a Master’s discourse (Zˇizˇek 2006/2009;
Perelson 2013), arguing that in permissive, post-oedipal
societies the technification of human reproduction by
biomedical experts will disrupt the basic ethico-symbolic
coordinates of civilisation. This type of response culmi-
nates in a plea for a massive return to symbolic authority
and oedipal order (S1 in the upper-left position) to halt our
sliding toward global chaos, autistic closure and patho-
logical narcissism (Zˇizˇek 2006/2009, p. 297).
Such a plea against biomedical power may easily evolve
into a provocative and hysterical form of protest ($ in the
upper-left position of agent), challenging the authority of
the technocrats (S2, unaware of the dangerous desire that
actually fuels their policies: a in the lower-left position),
and raising a “warning call” against looming Franken-
steinian or Brave New World scenarios (Vacquin 2002),
framing artificial reproduction as a major disruptive threat
to human dignity, well-being and culture. Interestingly, this
type of psychoanalytic agitation often focusses, not only on
the imaginary dimension (the uncanny Frankensteinian
image of the frozen embryo) but also on the linguistic
dimension, contesting the systematic neutralisation,
desexualisation and de-differentiation of language which
gives rise to a “lugubrious discourse” (Vacquin and Winter
2013, p. 87) of political correctness, a soft version of
Orwellian newspeak: an assault on language and its deep
ontological truths (p. 88), taking us from ‘sex without
children’ (the 1970s) via ‘children without sex’ (the 1980s)
towards a full neutralisation of sexual difference (p. 86).
Thus, the hysterical approach frantically endorses a re-
sexualisation of desire and reproduction in terms of père
and mère. Notwithstanding its vehemence, however, this
discourse does give rise to provocative insights, such as
the observation that the new technocratic, gender-neutral
language entails some paradoxical results: “How could we
move from the issues of the 1970s, the maximum of
sexuality with the minimum of reproduction, to the exact
opposite, the maximum of reproduction with the mini-
mum of sexuality?” (Vacquin 2002, p. 28); Or: “At the
beginning of the century, people were thinking about
freedom through sexuality, at the end of the century, they
wanted freedom from sexuality… Why?” (p. 29). What is
the desire that actually fuels the technification of human
reproduction?
Via such questions, discourse inevitably slides into a
more analytic mode, already voiced by Lacan, who points
out (while discussing a case of post mortem sperm
S2 (Freud speaking as expert) a (facing  an elusive  object)
S1 (inspired  by the  imperative  of Enlightenment) $ (ignoring mental  side-effects  as  by-product)
$ - the  warning  call, the voice of protest S1 – challenging the authority of the technocrats 
and their Brave new World scenarios 
a – the  obfuscated desire of technification S2 – revealing the paradoxes of technocratic 
discourse,  provoking academic reflection  
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donation) how artificial reproduction (and its discontents)
allows us to pinpoint the symbolical nature of fatherhood,
as fatherhood is now literally reduced to its quintessence:
the name-of-the-father, especially in cases where the ideal
donor apparently is a father of name and fame (preferably
dead), a pure signifier: a label on a sperm sample whose
surplus value stems from the genius’s surname (Lacan
1966a, b, p. 813, 1956–1957/1994, p. 375). At the same
time, this prominent father is bereft of something, namely
authoritative parental say in the child’s upbringing. In other
words, now that these possibilities are no longer science
fiction, they reveal the opacity of the quintessential “factor
x” of fatherhood, confronting us with fundamental uncer-
tainties concerning our basic signifiers, urging us to pose
some key questions anew, such as: what is fatherhood,
what is nature, what is technology and, eventually, why do
we want this?
Second exemplification: experimentation with
animals
And first glance, hysterical discourse seems an obvious
starting point for reconstructing the animal ethics debate,
involving activists who vehemently call attention to
instances of animal suffering. From a diachronic perspec-
tive, however, discontent in animal research actually began
as unintended by-product of university discourse ($ in the
lower-right position: Zwart 2008, p. 104 ff.). In contrast to
Descartes’ claim that animals (ontologically speaking) are
basically machines, physiologists inevitably discovered
that animals are sensitive organisms. Albrecht von Haller
(1707–1777) for instance became a physiology expert (S2)
by performing lengthy series of experiments on live ani-
mals in the early 1750s. By doing so, however, he
discovered that Descartes was wrong. Animals are not
machines. The (Real) properties of muscle tissue cannot be
explained in a purely mechanistic manner, as it displays an
intrinsic tendency to react when excitated (a phenomenon
Von Haller referred to as ‘irritability’), thereby revealing a
gap, a deficiency in the symbolic grid of Cartesianism. Yet,
this important, polemical insight confronted him with an
ethical dilemma. In order to understand animal life and to
do away with authoritative philosophical claims (S1), such
as the Cartesian (and Scholastic) idea that animals are
machines, experiments had to be performed on live
animals. But by doing so, the expert discovered that ani-
mals (notably mammals) are sensitive living beings, quite
capable of experiencing pain and distress, thus recasting
animal experiments as instances of torture. In others words,
in order to uncover the “animality” of animals, vivisection
was both necessary (from a methodological point of view)
and repulsive (from an ethical point of view). Initially Von
Haller argued that, although he found performing experi-
ments on animals revolting, in the interests of truth this
“cruelty” could not be avoided (Guerrini 2003, p. 65). Yet,
vivisection increasingly began to trouble his sensitive
mind. Finally, unable to solve his problem ($), he decided
to leave the field of physiology altogether and to devote
himself to theology, botany and verse-writing instead.
Or take the case of Johannes Peter Mu¨ller (1801–1858),
the most prominent German physiologist of his generation
(S2), who faced similar dilemmas and tried to alleviate the
problem by performing his experiments on frogs rather
than on dogs (which required considerable surgical dex-
terity), or by using anaesthetics (ether or morphine) to
mitigate the research animal’s pain (Guerrini 2003, p. 78).
Anaesthesia eliminated some major objections to vivisec-
tion, but precisely because it made vivisection less
disagreeable, it also resulted in an increase in the number
of experiments performed. Moreover, Mu¨ller clearly
recognised the methodological drawbacks involved. A
benumbed animal is no longer a normal, reliable model. In
other words, although laudable from an ethical point of
view, the use of anaesthetics was highly problematic from
a methodological standpoint, so that the expert was torn
between incommensurable normative claims: methodology
versus ethics (Zwart 2008, p. 107). Eventually, unable to
solve his dilemma in a satisfactory manner, he left the field,
and his moral malaise ($) may even have contributed to his
suicide (although this is still a controversial issue among
historians).
These experiences can be captured with the help of
Lacan’s quadrupeds. Initially, the scholarly view of what
animals (ontologically speaking) are was pre-structured by
a Master’s discourse. Thomas Aquinas already argued that
animals are basically machines (Zwart 1997) and in the
early modern period, Descartes became an authoritative
voice, as we have seen:
Discontent in this type of theoretical discourse, how-
ever, initiated a more experimental and scientific (hands-
on) approach, provoking an epistemic rupture and giving
The  credo “animals are machines” functions as 
a basic apodictic ontological claim (S1)
This claim inaugurates a mechanistic learned discourse 
on animals as soulless insensitive machines (S2)
The life-world experience of animals as 
sensitive living beings, hampering the 
legitimacy of vivisection ($), is obfuscated 
By-product: the jouissance (a) entailed in developing a 
mechanistic worldview, unhampered by sentimental 
‘prejudices’ 
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rise to physiology as a research field. A particular form of
expertise (S2) now functioned as ‘agent’ and discourse took
a quarter turn to the left:
The authoritative voice of the Other is ignored (‘repressed’),
although subconsciously S1 remains functional insofar as
physiologists engage in a tacit polemics with this discourse of
the Other. Thuswewitness the social production of a new form
of expertise, which initially was barred or discouraged by the
Master’s discourse. That which was left out of the picture: the
recalcitrant, inarticulate Real of Cartesianism, now becomes
physiology’s research target of choice (a), to which researchers
devote their career: the sensitivity (‘irritability’) of the living
organism, to be explored experimentally. But this again pro-
duces a situation ofmalaise, aswe have seen, so that the experts
become the victims of their own research ($) and physiology
becomes an impossible profession, questionable from within.
It is important to notice, by the way, that Descartes like-
wise worked as an empirical researcher for some time,
conducting anatomical explorations as a polemical practice
and as a route of escape from the authoritative voice of
Scholasticism (his version of the discourse of theMaster: S1),
thereby paving the way for anatomy as a university discourse
(S2). In the eighteenth century, however, Descartes (ironi-
cally, perhaps) had become an authoritative voice himself
(S1 in the upper-left position), giving rise to a new polemical
practice, namely physiology, resulting in a new exemplifi-
cation of what Lacan refers to as university discourse.
Gradually, however, due to technologies of ‘refinement’
(S2), experimentation with animal models became less
revolting, so that the real suffering of animals was partly
reduced, and partly obfuscated. As a result, in the course of
the twentieth century, the practice of animal experimenta-
tion became morally more sustainable, so that the number
of animal experiments increased exponentially. The
problem of professional malaise ($), which had threatened
to turn animal physiology into an impossible profession,
was reduced or by-passed, but never completely abolished,
so that in the 1970 s (the era of anti-psychiatry, but also of
a new wave of anti-vivisectionism) this obfuscated truth
was exposed by critical voices from outside, by advocates
and activists, acting in accordance with the structure of the
hysteric’s discourse.
In this new discourse, the official, institutionalised view (S1
in the upper-right position) is challenged, namely that animal
suffering is taken care of by trustworthy biomedical researchers
who, in partnership with professional bioethicists, developed
the necessary expertise, as a by-product of animal research
(S2), acting as participants in animal ethics committees, care-
fully and conscientiously balancing animal ‘discomfort’
against societal relevance, and committed to reducing suffering
via technical ‘refinements’. The hysterical voice which chal-
lenges this position is regarded as unreasonable/emotional ($)
by the establishment, and as inspired by latent motives, such as
the joy of rioting, or of enacting anarchistic or anachronistic
(technophobic) ideas. Nonetheless, the by-product of this clash
may consist in a broadening (enrichment) of the ethical
vocabulary, or in a quest for reliable alternatives, as substitutes
for in vivo animal models, such as in silico models (computer
programs) or cell cultures (S2, now in the lower right position,
as by-product of the debate):
But such a reframing of the animal ethics debate in terms
of conflicting discursive structures requires another per-
spective, quite unlike the other three, namely the analyst’s
discourse, revealing what makes these other discourses so
tempting at first, but also how each of them leads into a
deadlock sooner or later, so that speaking subjects seek
solace in another type of discourse, shifting their position,
taking a quarter turn, venturing a discursive leap:
Physiology as an autonomous form of 
expertise (S2)
Researchers intrigued by an unexpected and 
frustrating phenomenon: irritability (a)
The ontological claim that animals are machines 
(S1) is rejected / ignored
Professional malaise: repulsiveness of vivisection 
is now acknowledged ($)
Activists frantically disclosing the obfuscated violence 
inherent in animal research ($)
This challenges the official view (S1) that animal 
discomfort is balanced against health benefits by 
trustworthy experts 
The personal motives fuelling such accusations: the 
jouissance of oedipal revolt against society (a)
Research into non-animal alternatives and 
refinement techniques as by-product (S2)
Surveying with evenly-poised attention the
symptoms of the desire driving the scientific
cupido sciendi (a)
Challenging biomedical research and / or 
bioethics as ‘impossible professions’, tormented 
by incompatible claims ($)
Bioethical expertise suspended (S2), allowing 
speaking subjects to take the floor
The analyst falling into the trap of posing as the 
one who eventually knows best (S1)
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From an analyst’s perspective, the strength of the
Master’s discourse is that it challenges us to leave behind
our daily, intuitive views and experiences (concerning
animals for instance), and to adopt an (initially) quite
startling, daring and productive view, in this case the idea
that (human and animal) bodies are basically machines, an
insight which is allegedly confirmed by anatomical data
(S2).
Yet, sooner or later, in our interactions with real ani-
mals, notably in research practices that are more
demanding and confronting, the gaps and shortcomings of
this Master’s discourse, giving rise to all kinds of moral
and epistemological anomalies, can no longer be denied,
and subjects at a certain point are forced to take an epis-
temological leap from Master discourse (where, in the
upper-right position, they act as recipients and custodians
of the Master’s truth) to a different type of discourse, now
occupying the upper-left position of agent themselves. And
this is a liberating experience, for now, the reading of
books (absorbing the voice of the Other) gives rise to
something else, namely: real interaction with living
organisms, so that subjects achieve autonomy by devel-
oping a methodology, a dexterity, a ‘body of knowledge’ of
their own (S2).
But this new practice (notwithstanding the inviting
avenues for research opened up and the intellectual jouis-
sance it offers) eventually strands as well, as we have seen,
so that once again new research practices have to be
installed, allegedly less violent and revolting. And yet,
again, there is an intrusion of the Real, as the problem of
the physical and ontological violence implied in reducing
animals to experimental materials and laboratory tools is
obfuscated rather than solved. But this again requires a leap
into a new type of discourse, now coming from outside,
aimed at disclosing or even disrupting animal experimen-
tation (‘vivisection’, performed by experts in laboratories,
hidden from view) as a revolting practice.
Initially, this clash between discourses involves a
polemic in the imaginary domain: a clash of images, with
research laboratories publishing glossy pictures of perfectly
healthy animals in annual reports, to which animal activists
respond with shocking reproductions of sadistically tor-
tured animals in leaflets, advertisements and brochures.
Both types of images arouse suspicion, both are besides the
truth, so that gradually, a symbolisation of the debate
occurs, and the focus shifts from images to arguments, or
even numbers (how many animals are used?; how much
discomfort is inflicted?; how many therapeutic products are
generated?, etc.). This shift towards a less image-driven
debate also encourages the rise of a new type of university
discourse, known as professional bioethics, enacted by
ethical experts as participants in animal ethics committees.
Again, ideally, the bioethicist is someone who may play
all these roles: reading the classics (S1), participating in
ethical deliberations to coin or refine the signifiers (S2), but
also raising a voice of protest when physical or ontological
violence to animals is obfuscated ($). Precisely this alter-
nating between various roles culminates in the oblique
perspective of the analyst, revealing how and why this
interminable (and in many ways repetitive) process (which
unfolds both within and between discourses) continuous to
spiral and evolve, so that, in the course of time, an
incredible amount of knowledge (or at least discourse:
books, articles, conference papers, etc.: S2) is produced,
without ever coming to a stand-still, precisely because the
truth of the matter will never be captured once and for all.
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